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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Cases
Appellant Otis Hughes appeals from his judgment of conviction for conspiracy to traffic

heroin, trafficking heroin, and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. This
Court must vacate Mr. Hughes judgment of conviction because the district court’s denial of
defense counsel’s motion to withdraw violated Mr. Hughes right to effective and conflict-free
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
On May 18, 2017, an undercover officer purchased two grams of heroin from Benjamin

Jephson in the parking lot of the Boise Hotel and, on May 31, 2017, he purchased 4 grams of
heroin from Mr. Jephson. See Tr. p. 160-165. On May 31, 2017, police arrested Mr. Hughes as he
exited the Boise Hotel. PSI, p. 3. According to police, they placed a key card found in Mr.
Hughes’ pocket in the key slot of Room 616 and the door unlocked. Id. Police claimed that they
did not actually open the door of Room 616 until receiving a search warrant later that evening.
During execution of the search warrant, detectives located over four grams heroin, nine grams of
methamphetamine, marijuana and various paraphernalia. Id.
Theorizing that Mr. Hughes supplied the heroin that Mr. Jephson sold the undercover
officer, the state accused Mr. Hughes of conspiring with Mr. Jephson to traffic more than seven
grams of heroin in violation of I.C. §37-2732B(a)(6)(B), §18-1701, §37-3732B(b). R. 27-28. The
state further charged Mr. Hughes with two counts of aiding and abetting the delivery of more
than two grams of heroin on May 18 and 31 2017 in violation of I.C. §37-2732B(a)(6), §18-204.
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R. 29. The state charged Mr. Hughes with trafficking in more than two grams of heroin and
possession of a controlled substance — methamphetamine — with intent to deliver for the drugs
found in the hotel room. R. 28-29.1
The district court initially appointed the public defender. R. 17-18. On June 19, 2017,
private defense counsel appeared in the case. R. 19-20. On July 31, 2017, Mr. Hughes pled not
guilty to all charges and the district court scheduled trial for December 5, 2017. R 56, 57. On
November 6, 2015, Mr. Hughes personally wrote the court describing motions he believed
should be filed, indicating that he wanted to review the search warrant and to retain a copy of
discovery. R. 96-99.
On November 13, 2017, defense counsel moved to continue the trial to allow time to
investigate the search warrant’s authenticity and a potential witness who observed police breach
the door to Room 616 prior to the search warrant’s arrival. Tr. p. 11, ln. 13 - p. 12, ln. 17; R.
92-94. Mr. Jephson requested that the trial be re-scheduled within the six months required by
Idaho’s speedy trial statute, which was still nearly two months after the trial’s December 5
setting. See Tr. p. 15, ln. 12-19. The district court determined it would leave the trial as set unless
a motion to suppress was before it at which time it could determine whether a continuance was
warranted. Id. at p. 15, ln. 22 - p. 16, ln. 2.
At the end of the hearing, Mr. Jephson began to personally address the district court,
saying “I did not ever say [Mr. Hughes]—had anything to do with it” at which point Mr.
The jury found Mr. Hughes guilty of misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and
possession of drug paraphernalia for the marijuana and drug related items found in the hotel
room, respectively.
1
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Jephson’s counsel advised: “Your Honor, I told my client that you have no interest in him making
in-court statements regarding culpability.” R. 95; Tr. p. 21, ln. 14-18. The district court directed
Mr. Jephson to consult with his attorney and concluded the proceedings. Id. at p. 21, ln. 19-25.
On November 20, 2017, defense counsel advised the district court that he resolved his
concern about the search warrant and was ready to proceed to trial on December 5, 2017. Tr.
(11.20.17) p. 5, ln. 9-23. Mr. Hughes personally addressed the district court:
I’m trying to get it -- because there was some motions, there was evidence that should be
presented of my innocence. There's recordings of my innocence. There’s confessions, letters
that I'm trying to figure out is that going to be included in this trial? Because it looks like
there's an attempt to block it. I was told that since he's my co-defendant, he cannot testify and
cannot be called in trial.
So I'm trying to figure out what's going on because my innocence has been confessed plenty
of times. There is some letters that has been written. Like I said, sir, I'm nervous, I'm very
sorry. I just want the truth to come out. I don't want it to be a lie. I feel like a dismissal, a
motion for dismissal, should have been asked. I just want to know how do I get things on
record to where I don't even have to stand up, sir, and bother you with this? How do I send
letters in to the Court when —
Id. at p. 9, ln. 17 p. 10, ln. 11. The district court interrupted and advised Mr. Hughes that he
needed to “address things through your lawyer” and that counsel could advise whether evidence
was admissible. Id. at p. 10, ln. 11-20. The district court further instructed: “if you have a motion,
you could present it through your lawyer and he would make the motion rather than trying to
send me a letter.” Id. at p. 10, ln. 21-25
The following day, on November 21, 2017, Mr. Hughes’ attorney moved to withdraw,
explaining he could not provide Mr. Hughes with effective assistance of counsel. R. 103-07.
According to counsel’s supporting affidavit, he advised Mr. Hughes that a suppression motion
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would be frivolous and Mr. Hughes nonetheless insisted on personally addressing the issue with
the court the following day. R. 106. Mr. Hughes also sent the Idaho State Bar a copy of a letter to
counsel that outlined concerns with counsel’s handling of the case and which placed counsel and
Mr. Hughes in “potentially adversarial” positions. R. 106. Finally, counsel explained that he had
an additional ethical concern that he was “not at liberty to disclose to the court, but which makes
me unable to represent Mr. Hughes adequately at trial.” R. 107.
On November 27, 2017, the district court heard counsel’s motion to withdraw in the
prosecutor’s presence. Tr. p. 22, ln. 5-7. Counsel advised the district court that he had been
required to spend “a lot of time with Mr. Hughes” in part because a protective order precluded
him from leaving discovery with Mr. Hughes. Id. at p. 22, ln. 10-15. Counsel complained that
Mr. Hughes insisted that he “bring a motion to dismiss based on his theory that the search
warrant was dummied up by [the magistrate].” Id. at p. 22, ln. 16-25. In addition, counsel
explained there were “the other issues [Mr. Hughes] presented to the Court orally,” the motion’s
supporting affidavit and “he's now complained to the state bar, as well about my performance.”
Id. at p. 23, ln. 1-4.
The district count inquired whether Mr. Hughes had file a disciplinary action and counsel
responded:
No, it's a letter to the bar, which I received a certified copy from him basically with the
same notification. I'm not going to do anything to keep him from going to prison. He has
some unrealistic assumptions that don't bear out legally, and I've gone over with him those
many times.
For example, he thinks Mr. Jephson, the co-defendant, is going to get on the stand and
exonerate him. I talked with Mr. Jephson's attorney and his mom, and they assured me that's
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probably not going to happen. It's his choice, of course, but as it stands now it’s not going to
happen. I was contacted by his mother saying she wanted information, she wanted me to talk
to a detective and turn over discovery -- not a detective, an investigator, a privately hired
investigator. He sent me an email over the weekend. I've not responded to him until you
decide what you want to do.
I think with his frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic view of how the case
can be resolved, I can no longer give effective legal counsel.
Tr. p. 23, ln. 10 - p. 24, ln. 5.
The district court reasoned that counsel was ethically prohibited from pursing frivolous
motions and that the failure to pursue such a motion was not a basis for counsel to withdraw. Id.
at p. 24, ln. 15 - p. 25, ln. 7. The district court found that Mr. Hughes’ dissatisfaction with
counsel was not based on an ethical shortcoming in counsel’s performance and since counsel was
retained, Mr. Hughes could hire new counsel. Id. at p. 25, ln. 12-14. The district court
acknowledged that counsel:
might feel like he's in a difficult situation because a letter to the bar was written, but I believe
that [counsel] is a very good lawyer and can ethically do his best job, notwithstanding that
letter being filed.
The problem with allowing someone to withdraw every time someone writes a letter
complaining to the bar, particularly on the eve of trial, it's a recipe for abuse to allow -- to
basically put off trial. Right? Any time you don't want to go to trial, just send a letter to the
bar against your lawyer and there you have it. Because if I allow [counsel] to withdraw,
clearly you’re going to have a problem with the trial date in this case, and it's not just Mr.
Hughes' trial date that's at issue, it's a co-defendant case, Mr. Jephson is also affected by this,
and he has speedy trial rights.
So I'm not hearing anything that makes it impossible for [counsel] to do his best job to
represent his client in this case, and so I can't let you withdraw this close to trial based on
that.
The motion is denied
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Id. at p. 25, ln. 14 - p. 26, ln. 9. Mr. Hughes personally addressed the district court, explaining he
understood his attorney decided whether to file motions but where his co-defendant had vocally
confessed and disavowed Mr. Hughes’ involvement, he did not believe it unreasonable to ask his
attorney to file a motion to dismiss. Id. at p. 26, ln. 13 - p. 27, ln. 5. The district court explained
dismissal motions were rare in criminal cases, that counsel was “a very good lawyer” and would
use exculpatory evidence if permitted. Id. at p. 27, ln. 6 - p. 28, ln. 21.
Mr. Hughes then clarified he did not mind “no coming up” but his attorney had moved to
withdraw because he asked him to let the judge decide the motion. Id. at 29, ln. 1-8. Mr. Hughes
continued:
And now we are at a situation to where he does not trust me. We are at a situation to where
would it even be good to go to trial, because he's very disappointed in what I did I mean, I
had to try to be heard the best I could. I don't feel like it’s unreasonable.
Id. at p. 29, ln. 9-14. The district court responded:
I fully trust and expect that [counsel] will do everything he can to try to get you acquitted at
trial. That's what his job is and that's what his reputation is based on. And to the extent that
you made some complaints to the bar, he will deal with that afterwards, but in defense of you
he will do the best he can, and I'm certainly he can do, that. And I'm certain he's not going to
harbor ill feelings that will cause him to sabotage your case or anything like that. I have a
good amount of respect for the job that he can do for you.
Id. at p. 30, ln. 19 - p. 31, ln. 5.
The case proceeded to trial. After the state presented closing argument, Mr. Hughes
interceded: “Your Honor, my attorney has not represented me property, effectively and he’s
doing it on purpose.” Tr. p. 697, ln. 10-19. The district court admonished the jury: “Ladies and
gentlemen, you’ll ignore and not consider the statement by Mr. Hughes at this time. Please
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disregard it and not consider it in any way.” Id. at 697, ln. 19-22. Counsel then began his closing
argument on Mr. Hughes behalf. Partway through, the district court recessed, advising the jury it
needed to “talk to the lawyers about something.” Id. at p. 700, ln. 20-24.
Outside the jury’s presence, the district addressed Mr. Hughes’ “outburst” and inquired:
“Mr. Hughes, what's the problem?” Id. at p. 701, ln. 1-7. Mr. Hughes replied:
The problem, your Honor — I apologize to the Court and to everybody — the problem is
this man is not asking the questions that I have asked him to ask, I mean multiple questions. I
don't — there was witnesses to be presented, as well as other things, and it's the same old
thing.
And I don't want to disrespect this man, I know you guys all know him, I apologize to the
Court, but he's not representing me. I'm finding that the district attorney is doing her job
diligently, questioning people for hours at a time, whereas my attorney only questions them
one time or he don’t question them at all. Of course he's the professional, and he knows when
to and not to, I guess, but this is just not looking right, and it's really putting me out there.
And that's what it is, sir, and I'm sorry. I know you probably give me some extra time,
whatever, but this is my life and this is not right.
Id. at p. 701, ln. 8 - p. 702, ln. 1. The district court responded:
Mr. Hughes, here's the deal, the strategy of counsel is firmly left to counsel, with consultation
with the client. We are at a point where the evidence is closed, so any concerns about what
[counsel] has done or not done with respect to the evidence, that has been -- that ship as
sailed, as we say.
Id. at p. 702, ln. 2-8. The district court inquired whether Mr. Hughes wished to fire counsel and
present his own closing, which Mr. Hughes declined. Id. at p. 702, ln. 9-15. The district court
admonished Mr. Hughes that if spoke again spoke in the jury’s presence, he would be removed
from the courtroom. Id. at p. 703, ln. 18-25. The jury found Mr. Hughes guilty of conspiracy to
traffic in more than seven grams of heroin, trafficking in heroin and possessing
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver. R. 217-220.
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On December 12, 2017, counsel again moved to withdraw. R. 222. In addition to the
bases identified in his initial affidavit, counsel averred that: “Mr. Hughes repeatedly insisted that
his counsel [elicit] certain testimony from the State's witness by asking questions that his counsel
repeated[ly] told him were improper and or irrelevant.” R. 226. Counsel advised that Mr. Hughes
“made clear that he did not believe he was receiving adequate representation at trial” and “would
not accept his counsel's explanations regarding rules of evidence and admissibility.” R. 226.
Counsel averred: “Given the defendant's lack of confidence in his counsel which has been
demonstrated to the Court on more than one occasion and the mutual lack of trust between
counsel and the defendant, you affiant does not feel it is appropriate or ethical to continue
representing the defendant in this matter.” R. 226. The district court granted counsel’s motion
and appointed the public defender to represent Mr. Hughes. R. 230, 241.
The district court sentenced Mr. Hughes to a unified term of twenty-two years with a
minimum period of confinement of twelve years for conspiracy to traffic in heroin; concurrent
unified terms of ten years with minimum periods of confinement of three years for trafficking in
heroin and a concurrent a unified term of seven years, all indeterminate, for possession of
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. R. 276-80. This appeal follows.
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Did the district court violate Mr. Hughes’ right effective assistance of conflict-counsel as
protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution by denying counsel’s
motion to withdraw and compelling counsel to represent Mr. Hughes under an active conflict of
interest?
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IV. THIS COURT MUST VACATE MR. HUGHES’ JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT DEPRIVED MR. HUGHES OF HIS
SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF CONFLICT-FREE
COUNSEL BY DENYING COUNSEL’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND
COMPELLING COUNSE TO REPRESENT MR. HUGHES WHILE
LABORING UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the
assistance of conflict-free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); State v. Carver,
155 Idaho 489, 491, 314 P.3d 171, 173 (2013). Once alerted to a potential conflict, the Sixth
Amendment requires the trial court to conduct a thorough and searching examination of the
potential conflict, which should be conducted on the record. Smith v. Lockhart, 923 F.2d 1314,
1320 (8th Cir. 1991); Carver, 155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at 174; State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694, 704, 215 P.3d 414, 424 (2009); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484 (1978).
The trial court must first determine whether a conflict actually exists, necessarily relying on
defense counsel’s good faith and good judgment. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47
(1980); Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424. Next, if the trial court finds that defense
counsel is burdened with a conflict of interest, it must obtain the defendant’s knowing and
voluntary waiver or give the defendant an opportunity to acquire new counsel. Id. If the court
concludes that a conflict of interest does not exist, the representation may continue without a
waiver. Id.
When a defendant timely objects to a conflict of interest, the Sixth Amendment imposes a
distinct constitutional obligation to inquire. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 488–90; Severson, 147 Idaho
at 703–04, 215 P.3d at 423–24. The constitutional violation is complete when the trial court
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erroneously overrules such an objection and the conviction must be vacated without inquiry into
whether an actual conflict adversely affected the lawyer's performance. Holloway, 435 U.S. at
488–90; Severson, 147 Idaho at 703–04, 215 P.3d at 423–24. Where the defendant did not object
to the conflict at trial, the conviction must be reversed when an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance without the need to show prejudice. Sullivan, 446
U.S. at 348; Severson, 147 Idaho at 703, 215 P.3d at 423.
The Sixth Amendment’s protection does not impair the trial court's ability to deal with
counsel who files an untimely motion for separate counsel for dilatory purposes. Holloway, 435
U.S. at 486–87. However, an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the
face of a justifiable request for delay violates the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1983).
Trial counsel moved to withdraw because the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated
and become potentially adverse. At the hearing on his motion, counsel supported his motion to
withdraw by impermissibly disclosing that Mr. Hughes wished to pursue legal theories counsel
found frivolous, refused counsel’s advice and had no defense at trial because his co-defendant
would not take the stand. Despite being presented with an actual conflict of interest, the district
court found defense counsel would set aside any hard feelings and compelled him to represent
Mr. Hughes at trial while laboring against a conflict of interest against his own client. The district
court’s denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw violated Mr. Hughes’ right to effective and
conflict-free counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This Court should therefore vacate Mr. Hughes judgment of conviction.
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A.

Standard of Review
Whether the trial court should provide substitute counsel is a discretionary decision,

which this Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. Severson, 147 Idaho at 702, 215 P.3d at 422;
Carver, 155 Idaho at 491, 314 P.3d at 173. Nonetheless, this Court freely reviews the underlying
constitutional issues such as whether the trial court’s inquiry into a potential conflict of interest
satisfied the Sixth Amendment’s effective assistance of counsel guarantee. Severson, 147 Idaho
at 702, 215 P.3d at 422; State v. Lopez, 139 Idaho 256, 259, 77 P.3d 124, 127 (Ct. App. 2003).
B.

The District Court Deprived Mr. Hughes of his Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Assistance of Conflict-Free Counsel by Failing to Conduct an Adequate Inquiry
Trial courts necessarily rely in large measure on the good faith and good judgment of

defense counsel to identify conflicts of interest. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346; State v. Hall, 163
Idaho 744, 793, 419 P.3d 1042, 1091 (2018), reh'g denied (June 28, 2018); Severson, 147 Idaho
at 704, 215 P.3d at 424; Carver, 155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at 174. Indeed, the Idaho Rules of
Professional Conduct advise that courts should ordinarily accept the lawyer's statement that
professional considerations require termination of the representation as sufficient because a
lawyer may be bound to keep facts supporting a motion to withdraw confidential. Rule 1.16,
comment 3. While the trial court may explore the adequacy of defense counsel's representations
regarding a conflict of interest, it should not improperly require counsel to disclose the
confidential communications of the client. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487. Such compelled
disclosure creates significant risks of unfair prejudice, especially when the disclosure is to a
judge who may be called upon later to impose sentences on the attorney's clients. Id. at 487, n.11.
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Here, the district court not only permitted defense counsel to divulge confidential
communications adverse to Mr. Hughes in the prosecutor’s presence, it disregarded counsel’s
representations that a conflict of interest and deterioration of the attorney-client relationship
prevented him from providing effective assistance. Then, without addressing whether counsel
was conflicted, the district court determined counsel was able to set aside any conflict and
provide adequate representation. The district court erroneously denied defense counsel’s motion
to withdraw thereby violating Mr. Hughes’ Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel and
requiring this Court to vacate his judgment of conviction.
1.

The district court improperly permitted counsel to divulge confidential
communications harmful to Mr. Hughes in the presence of the prosecutor

Trial counsel, as an officer of the court, averred that he could no longer provide effective
representation due to deterioration in the attorney/client relationship, a potentially adversarial
relationship caused by Mr. Hughes’ correspondence to the Bar and “an ethical concern” that
counsel was not “at liberty to disclose to the court, but which” prevented counsel from
adequately representing Mr. Hughes at trial. R. 104-107. In so advising the district court, defense
counsel complied with his ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to advise
the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346–47; see
also IRCP 1.16 (lawyer shall withdraw from the representation of a client if the representation
will violate rules of professional conduct or other law).
At the hearing on counsel’s motion to withdraw, defense counsel complained that Mr.
Hughes insisted that he “bring a motion to dismiss based on his theory that the search warrant
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was dummied up by [the magistrate]” and “has some unrealistic assumptions that don't bear out
legally, and I've gone over with him those many times.” Tr. p. 23, ln. 10 - 23. Counsel then
advised the district court and prosecutor that Mr. Hughes believed his co-defendant would
exonerate him on the stand but that discussions with Mr. Jephson's attorney and his mom
revealed he was unlikely to testify. Id. at p. 23, ln. 16-21. Counsel concluded that because of Mr.
Hughes’ “frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic view of how the case can be
resolved, I can no longer give effective legal counsel. Id. at p. 24, ln. 1-5.
Lawyers may only reveal information relating to a client’s representation when the client
gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation or
falls within a permitted exception such as “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.” IRCP 1.6. A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client absent informed
consent or except as permitted or required by the rules of conduct. IRCP 1.8(b)
Counsel’s colloquy regarding his heroic efforts with a client who insisted he act
unethically significantly breached his duty of confidentiality and loyalty. As noted by the
Holloway Court, such disclosures created a significant risk of unfair prejudice, especially
disclosures to the sentencing judge. 435 U.S. at 487, n.11. Here, the confidential disclosures
were made to the prosecutor in addition to the court and included information regarding trial
strategy.
The district court violated Mr. Hughes’ right to counsel by allowing his attorney to
divulge confidential information and by not holding an ex parte hearing to delve into the details
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of Mr. Hughes’ relationship with his attorney. While trial counsel volunteered confidential
information, counsel had already advised the district court that his professional judgment was
impaired by a conflict, thereby invoking the district court’s independent duty to conduct a
constitutionally adequate inquiry. It necessarily falls on the district court in such circumstances to
not aggravate a Sixth Amendment violation by allowing counsel to divulge confidential
information harmful to the defendant, especially in the prosecutor’s presence.
These circumstances are also contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
which recognize difficulty may be encountered if withdrawal is based on the client's demand that
the lawyer engage in unprofessional conduct during pending litigation and withdrawal requires
court approval. IRCP 1.16, comment 3. Lawyers must remain mindful of their obligations to both
clients and the court under Rules 1.6 and 3.3 and a court should ordinarily accept the lawyer's
statement that professional considerations require termination of the representation ordinarily
should be accepted as sufficient. Id.
Rather than rely on counsel’s representations regarding a conflict, the district court held a
hearing in the prosecutor’s presence and allowed counsel to disparage his client in order to
justify his request to withdraw. The district court violated Mr. Hughes Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and his conviction must be vacated.
2.

The district court failed to determine whether counsel labored under a
conflict of interest or whether Mr. Hughes waived any such conflict

The Sixth Amendment required the district court to conduct a thorough and searching
examination and determine whether a conflict actually existed. See Holloway, 435 U.S. at 48;
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Carver, 155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at 174; Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424. In
determining whether the conflict existed, the district court was entitled to rely on defense
counsel’s representations. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346-47; Carver, 155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at
174; Severson, 147 Idaho at 704, 215 P.3d at 424.
Here, the district court did not expressly determine whether Mr. Hughes’ “frequent and
public complaints and his unrealistic view” created a conflict of interest for counsel. Instead, the
district court concluded that counsel “might feel like he's in a difficult situation because a letter
to the bar was written, but I believe that [counsel] is a very good lawyer and can ethically do his
best job, notwithstanding that letter being filed.” Tr. p. 25, ln. 12-18. Thus, the district court
found that defense counsel could provide competent and diligent representation notwithstanding
the conflict and notwithstanding counsel’s own assertions to the contrary.
The circumstances at bar stand in contrast to those in Carver, where this Court affirmed
the district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw. There, defense counsel averred via affidavit
that the defendant's aggressive conduct and resulting fear for his safety would present a
distraction and prevent impartial and zealous representation. However, at the hearing on
counsel’s motion, defense counsel offered no details other than the motion was filed at the
defendant’s request. Carver, 155 Idaho at 491, 314 P.3d at 173. The defendant then recited a list
of grievances against defense counsel but denied that he intended to threaten his counsel
physically and counsel did not respond further. Id. The Court found that the district court made a
thorough and searching inquiry into whether there was a conflict based upon defense counsel's
belief that the defendant had threatened to harm him. Id.
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Unlike the attorney in Carver, defense counsel continued to assert a conflict of interest
during the hearing and illustrated the conflict’s existence by revealing disparaging information
regarding his client in effort to defend himself. Not only was the district court entitled to rely on
counsel’s representation, it was unreasonable to fail to do so here. Rather than rely on defense
counsel’s assessment, the district court used defense counsel’s disclosures regarding confidential
communications to determine Mr. Hughes’ complaints regarding counsel’s performance were not
legitimate. However, the district court failed to evaluate the conflict raised in counsel’s motion
— the impact of the potentially adversarial relationship between Mr. Hughes and counsel.
Moreover, even if the district court could correctly determine that an attorney was
capable of setting aside a conflict over the an attorney’s contrary statement, it could not waive
the conflict on Mr. Hughes’ behalf. After the district court advised that counsel was sufficiently
skilled and ethical to provide competent representation notwithstanding any conflict, Mr. Hughes
explained that his issue with counsel went beyond disagreement regarding trial strategy. Tr. p. 29,
ln. 1-14. Mr. Hughes explained that counsel responded to their disagreement by moving to
withdraw. Id. at p. 29, ln. 9-14. Mr. Hughes believed his attorney no longer trusted him and was
disappointed in him. Id.
Again, disregarding both counsel and Mr. Hughes’ opinion on the subject, the district
court found defense counsel could set aside any conflict and adequately represent Mr. Hughes at
trial. The district court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry into the conflict of interest raised in
counsel’s motion to withdraw and violated Mr. Hughes’ right to counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.
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3.

The district court’s failure to conduct a constitutionally adequate inquiry
requires this Court to vacate Mr. Hughes judgment of conviction

Joint representation of conflicting interests is inherently suspect and counsel’s conflicting
obligations make it difficult to measure the precise harm arising from counsel's errors. Holloway,
435 U.S. at 489–490. Thus, a conflict that the defendant and his counsel attempt to avoid by
timely objection is presumed to undermine the adversarial process. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S.
162, 168, (2002). This presumption is in accord with other direct violations of the Sixth
Amendment. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006) (erroneous
deprivation of the right to counsel of choice has consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable
and indeterminate and unquestionably qualifies as structural error); Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 820–21 (1975) (an unwanted attorney “represents” the defendant only through a
tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction as the defense presented is neither his defense nor the
defense guaranteed him by the Constitution).
Defense counsel moved to withdraw asserting he could not provide effective assistance of
counsel due to a potentially adversarial situation. Then, at the hearing on his motion, counsel
defended his decisions during Mr. Hughes’ representation by revealing confidential information
averse to Mr. Hughes. The district court nonetheless found that defense counsel was sufficiently
skilled and ethical to set aside any conflict, failing to recognize the active conflict of interest
evidenced by counsel’s breach of his duties of confidentiality and loyalty. The district court’s
inquiry failed to satisfy the Sixth Amendment and Mr. Hughes’ judgment of conviction must be
vacated.
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B.

An Actual Conflict of Interest Adversely Affected Defense Counsel’s Performance
In addition to the presumption of prejudice applicable in this case, Mr. Hughes’

judgement of conviction must be vacated because counsel labored under an actual conflict of
interest that adversely effected his performance. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348. A defense
attorney’s unauthorized disclosure of confidential information necessarily implicates the
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel as well as the attorney's
duty of loyalty. State v. Jones, 923 P.2d 560, 563 (Mont. 1996); see also People v. Ragusa, 220 P.
3d 1002, 1007 (Colo. App. 2009) (breach of confidentiality one factor which evidences an actual
conflict of interest between defendant and her counsel that adversely effected their performance).
Here, counsel disclosed confidential communications that were harmful to Mr. Hughes
during the hearing on his motion to withdraw and in his affidavits in support of his motions to
withdraw. Counsel’s conduct establishes an actual conflict of interest between defense counsel’s
interests and those of his client. Further, this conflict caused counsel to provide disparaging
information to the district court and prosecutor and effected his performance at trial.
Accordingly, counsel’s actual conflict of interest adversely effected his performance and the
Sixth Amendment requires this Court to vacate Mr. Hughes’ judgment of conviction.
1.

counsel labored under an actual conflict of interest

The attorney’s duty of loyalty is “perhaps the most basic of counsel’s duties.” Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). A lawyer’s duty of diligence requires him to “act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
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client's behalf.” IRCP 1.3, comment 1. Thus, a “lawyer shall not use information relating to
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client” and to the benefit of the lawyer,
except as permitted by the rules such as when there is an adversarial relationship between
counsel and the client. IRCP 1.6(b); 1.8(b), cmnt 5.
In Jones, counsel’s narrative in support of his motion to withdraw detailed the
defendant’s guilt and why counsel believed the defendant should not go to trial. Jones, 923 P.2d
at 567. By placing his personal interests above those of the client, counsel created an obvious
conflict of interest. Id. Similarly, defense counsel violated duties of loyalty and confidentiality by
supporting a motion to withdraw with protected client information and describing client’s
proposed defense as frivolous. City of Libby v. Hubbard, 408 P.3d 532, 536 (Mont. 2018).
However, because substitute counsel represented the defendant at trial, automatic reversal was
not warranted. Id.
Here, in counsel’s affidavit and during the hearing on his motion to withdraw, defense
counsel advised the district court and prosecutor that Mr. Hughes insisted that counsel pursue
motions he deemed frivolous. R. 106; Tr. p. 22, ln. 10-25. Counsel also told the district court and
prosecutor that Mr. Hughes refused to except his explanations regarding “unrealistic assumptions
that don't bear out legally” even though he had “gone over [them] with him those many times.”
Id. at p. 23, ln. 10-15. Counsel then disclosed:
For example, he thinks Mr. Jephson, the co-defendant, is going to get on the stand and
exonerate him. I talked with Mr. Jephson's attorney and his mom, and they assured me that's
probably not going to happen. It's his choice, of course, but as it stands now it’s not going to
happen. I was contacted by his mother saying she wanted information, she wanted me to talk
to a detective and turn over discovery -- not a detective, an investigator, a privately hired
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investigator. He sent me an email over the weekend. I've not responded to him until you
decide what you want to do.
I think with his frequent and public complaints and his unrealistic view of how the case
can be resolved, I can no longer give effective legal counsel.
Id. at p. 23, ln. 16 - p. 24, ln. 5.
These revelations placed Mr. Hughes in a negative light and advised the prosecutor of the
likely defense (or absence thereof) that would be presented at trial. Counsel’s statements
benefitted only one person — counsel — by justifying his heroic efforts with a client he found
unreasonable. Counsel’s conduct at the hearing on his motion to withdraw establishes he was
operating under an active conflict between his own interests and those of his client.
2.

counsel’s conflict adversely effected his performance

As discussed above, counsel advised the district court and prosecutor that Mr. Hughes
wished to pursue frivolous defenses and that his co-defendant had no intention of exonerating
him. After trial, counsel again moved to withdraw. In his supporting affidavit, counsel alleged
that: “During the course of his jury trial in this case, Mr. Hughes repeatedly insisted that his
counsel try to illicit [sic] certain testimony from the State's witness by asking questions that
his counsel repeated told him were improper and or irrelevant.” R. 226. Counsel also indicated
that: “Mr. Hughes made clear that he did not believe he was receiving adequate representation at
trial and would not accept his counsel's explanations regarding rules” and that defendant’s
mother had disparaged counsel since trial. R. 226.
Like the communications discussed above, counsel evidenced a conflict of interest by
violating the duties of confidentiality and loyalty and disclosing information placing his client in
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a negative light in order to defend counsel’s own actions. These disclosures to the same judge
who ultimately sentenced Mr. Hughes created a significant risk of unfair prejudice. See
Holloway, 435 U.S. at 487 n.11. Counsel’s affidavit also establishes that the distrust caused by
counsel’s disregard for his duty of loyalty permeated the trial, which culminated in Mr. Hughes’
statement in front of the jury.
The district court compelled counsel to represent Mr. Hughes at trial while laboring under
an actual conflict between his own interest and those of his client. This conflict caused counsel to
reveal confidential information that was harmful to Mr. Hughes and impacted his ability to act as
a zealous advocate at trial. The district court’s refusal to allow counsel to withdraw before trial
violated Mr. Hughes’ right to a conflict-free and effective attorney and his judgment of
conviction must be vacated.
D.

Neither Judicial Efficiency Nor Dilatory Intent Can Justify The District Court’s
Violation of Mr. Hughes’ Right To Conflict-Free and Effective Counsel
Judicial efficiency must be balanced against the constitutional right to counsel. State v.

Rockstahl, 159 Idaho 364, 370, 360 P.3d 373, 379 (Ct. App. 2015). An unreasoning and arbitrary
insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel Morris, 461 U.S. at 11–12; Holloway, 435 U.S. at
486–87.
The district court acknowledged that Mr. Hughes’ complaints might make counsel “feel
like he's in a difficult situation” but commented that:
the problem with allowing someone to withdraw every time someone writes a letter
complaining to the bar, particularly on the eve of trial, it's a recipe for abuse to allow -- to
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basically put off trial. Right? Any time you don't want to go to trial, just send a letter to the
bar against your lawyer and there you have it. Because if I allow [counsel] to withdraw,
clearly you’re going to have a problem with the trial date in this case, and it's not just Mr.
Hughes' trial date that's at issue, it's a co-defendant case, Mr. Jephson is also affected by this,
and he has speedy trial rights.
p. 25, ln. 19 - p. 26, ln. 4. Since the district court did “not hear[] anything that makes it
impossible for [counsel] to do his best job to represent his client in this case,” it could not permit
counsel to withdraw “this close to trial.” Id. at p. 26, ln. 5-8.
However, the district court found neither counsel’s request to withdraw nor Mr. Hughes’
complaints were abusive or dilatory. To the contrary, the district court repeatedly lauded
counsel’s ethics. Moreover, almost two months remained in the statutory speedy trial period and
the trial had not been previously continued. In the prior discussion of a continuance, Mr. Jephson
did not object to a continuance within the speedy trial timeframe. Tr. p. 15, ln. 12-19. It was
unreasonable to deny counsel’s motion to withdraw because complaints about counsel could
potentially be abused in some circumstance other than the one at bar.
Further, there is no indication that counsel moved to withdraw at Mr. Hughes’ direction or
that Mr. Hughs sent a letter to the bar to trigger such a motion. To the contrary, at the hearing on
the motion to withdraw, Mr. Hughes complained that counsel filed a motion to withdraw in
reaction to Mr. Hughes’ statements to the court and bar and “now we are at a situation to where
he does not trust me . . . where would it even be good to go to trial, because he's very
disappointed in what I did I mean, I had to try to be heard the best I could.” Tr. p. 29, ln. 9-14.
This circumstance can be contrasted with that in State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 10, 909 P.2d
624, 628 (Ct. App. 1995), where the defendant filed a pro se motion for appointment of new
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counsel and told the court that he had filed a malpractice suit against the attorneys, which he
believed created a conflict of interest. The defendant’s attorneys indicated there had been no
communication with their client for three weeks because the defendant refused to speak with
them and they had diligently investigated the case and pursued the defendant’s leads. Id. at p. 10,
909 P.2d at 628. The Court reasoned that a criminal defendant may not compel the court to
appoint a new attorney by refusing to cooperate with his existing attorney or otherwise
manufacturing his own conflict. Id.
Conversely, in this case, counsel moved to withdraw and reiterated in open court that he
could not provide effective representation. Illustrating that point, counsel improperly disclosed
confidential communications that were averse to Mr. Hughes and to the benefit of counsel. Mr.
Hughes acknowledged that his attorney had the authority to make strategic decisions but
expressed concern that counsel’s decision to move to withdraw reflected that counsel no longer
trusted Mr. Hughes. Particularly considering the relatively young age of the criminal case, the
district court’s decision to deny counsel’s motion to withdraw based on concerns of judicial
efficiency and potential abuse was arbitrary and violated Mr. Hughes’ right to counsel as
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Trial counsel moved to withdraw because the attorney-client relationship had deteriorated
and become potentially adverse. At the hearing on his motion, counsel supported his motion to
withdraw by impermissibly disclosing that Mr. Hughes wished to pursue legal theories counsel
found frivolous, refused counsel’s advice and had no defense at trial because his co-defendant
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would not take the stand. Despite the actual conflict of interest, the district court compelled
defense counsel to represent Mr. Hughes at trial while laboring against a conflict of interest with
his own client. The district court’s denial of counsel’s motion to withdraw violated Mr. Hughes’
right to effective and conflict-free counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. This Court should therefore vacate Mr. Hughes judgment of conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 7th day of February 2019.
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